

CONFIDENTIALFRANKFORT SPEECH

Estimated time: 10 Mins.

DELINEATION OF DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES

(Second speech by member of CIG contingent at
the Second Frankfort Conference, May 1947)By GSC

"Delineation of Departmental Responsibilities" is too broad a subject to take at its face value in a short talk. Therefore, I plan to limit my comments principally to those fundamental departmental responsibilities which are the basis for coordinating collection activity.

Over-all relationships between the Departments and the National Intelligence Authority have already been outlined in the discussion of NIA top structure, completed a few minutes ago. In addition to establishing those over-all relationships, the President's letter also contained two explicit statements of departmental intelligence responsibility.

One of these statements is very basic, and very important. In it, the President instructed the three Secretaries that the existing intelligence agencies of their departments should continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence. Thus, the President made it clear once and for all that the establishment of CIG in no way relieves a department of its organic responsibilities. This means, for example, that the Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff retains total and exclusive responsibility to the Chief of Staff and to the Secretary of War for all War Department intelligence as defined in Field Manual 30-5. None of that responsibility may be laid on an outside agency. Conversely, no outside agency can interfere with this purely internal War Department responsibility.

However, this does not imply that a department should use only its own collecting resources to satisfy its responsibilities when other good resources are freely available. When intelligence information required by a department can be readily furnished by an outside agency, obviously the department should exploit the coordinating facilities of the Central Intelligence Group and take whatever other steps may be necessary to secure the information from the outside

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agency. Nevertheless, it remains fully responsible to follow through and be sure that the material is received.

In the other statement of departmental responsibility, the President directed that departmental intelligence material designated by the National Intelligence Authority shall be made freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. The National Intelligence Authority implemented this provision in their first directive - NIA Directive No. 1. First, they directed that all necessary facilities, intelligence and information in the possession of their respective departments should be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence, or to his authorized representative, as required in the performance of his mission, and they charged the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board with carrying this out. Second, they directed that recommendations approved by the NIA would, where applicable, govern the intelligence activities of their respective departments; and again they charged the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board with responsibility for seeing that the approved recommendations are carried out, within their respective departments.

Finally, in a later directive, they specifically directed the Director of Central Intelligence to act for them in coordinating all federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security; and again charged their departments with making available necessary facilities and assistance required for the performance of this function.

To summarize, each Secretary holds his own department responsible to conform to coordinating arrangements made by the Director of Central Intelligence under NIA direction; and each holds his department responsible to furnish the Director, or his representatives, all intelligence or intelligence information required to carry out his mission. These principles are almost sufficient, without elaboration, to provide the complete basis for the coordination of collection activities. However, after NIA Directive No. 1 was published a need developed for an amplifying statement of policy on the coordination of collection, particularly as it might affect field representatives. Therefore, the subject was placed under interdepartmental study and NIA Directive No. 7 was issued as a result. Most of you are familiar with it, since it was distributed as an enclosure to the War Department's letter of 25 February 1947, subject: Coordination of Collection Activities. The State Department has also circulated the text to its field representatives, with appropriate covering instructions.

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As pointed out in the War Department letter, NIA Directive No. 7 does not impair the normal command relationship between the War Department and its own intelligence representatives in the field; the latter continue to receive all their instructions directly from the War Department. The same principle governs the relations between all the other departments and their field representatives.

The Central Intelligence Group attaches special importance to the paragraph in NIA Directive No. 7 which provides for designation of a field coordinator of collection activities. The senior U. S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign service post is held responsible for the coordination of all collection activities in his area, and for the proper implementation of that coordination within the spirit of the principles enunciated by NIA Directive No. 7. Normally, wherever the United States has a diplomatic mission the Chief of Mission, or in his absence the Charge' 'd Affaires, is the coordinator; in areas where there is no diplomatic mission, the officer in charge of the consular district or post is the coordinator. On the other hand, in foreign areas entirely under U. S. military command, the U. S. military commander is the coordinator. There are, of course, the usual borderline cases requiring interpretation, and if a field representative should have any doubt as to who is the coordinator in a specific area, an inquiry directly to his own department should quickly resolve it. However, I believe instructions already issued by the departments have adequately covered doubtful points. For example, paragraph 6 d of the War Department's letter of 25 February fully covers the case where diplomatic or consular stations are included in a military command area.

It is important to remember that the coordinator's responsibility to the National Intelligence Authority is through the individual Cabinet member at the head of his department. Thus, if the coordinator is a military commander, he is responsible to the Secretary of War for carrying out the principles of NIA Directive No. 7. If the coordinator is a State Department official, he is responsible to the Secretary of State.

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The only other feature of NIA Directive No. 7 which may need amplifying comment is the paragraph which allocates agency collection responsibility within certain broad fields of subject matter. The allocations are more or less obvious: i.e., political, cultural or sociological subject matter is allocated to the State Department; and military and naval subject matter to the War and Navy Departments, respectively. Economic or scientific subject matter is not specifically allotted; each agency is held responsible in accordance with its individual needs.

This broad formula is largely academic, so far as individual field representatives are concerned; it is primarily a convenient yardstick for determining which department in Washington shall be assigned a field collection mission to be performed for the NIA. It is, of course, equally convenient for use by an area coordinator in determining which of the field representatives under his supervision shall perform a particular collection mission. It rarely gives a complete solution, for in most cases a collection problem does not fall exclusively in any single field of subject matter. When a collection problem falls into overlapping fields, the Office of Collection and Dissemination of CIG is responsible to allocate the tasks between all the Washington agencies concerned in such a way as to prevent unproductive duplication and at the same time assure complete coverage. The coordinator has a similar responsibility in the field.

The allocations do not affect relations between departments and their field representatives. A field representative reports to his own department as it may require, on any and all subjects. Thus, for example, the Navy Department, after exhausting Washington resources, may require a naval attache to submit a report on a sociological subject. However, in such a case the naval attache ought to secure the assistance of the local State Department personnel. In turn, under the provisions of NIA Directive No. 7, the local State Department representatives are responsible to make their sociological intelligence information freely available to the naval attache. The area coordinator is responsible to see that necessary mutual assistance is given. Field representatives should appeal freely to the area coordinator, whenever necessary, for assistance in collection problems relating to subject matter outside their normal purview.

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Each area coordinator is expected, wherever practicable and within the limits of security requirements, to establish a central intelligence file for the use of all authorized personnel at the station. He is expected to insure that unproductive collection duplication is avoided. When the departmental intelligence representative who would ordinarily be responsible for collection in a given subject field is absent, the coordinator is expected to allocate the responsibility to another field representative most competent to carry the responsibility, considering and taking full advantage of the individual capabilities and contacts of all his staff members. He is also expected to insure that any intelligence information, regardless of who collected it, shall whenever possible be transmitted immediately to the local field representative of the agency having primary interest.

Similarly, at the departmental level in Washington, the allocations of responsibility in terms of subject matter do not completely exempt a department from responsibility to the NIA for a subject not within its chief field. For example, if the NIA requires intelligence information on a sociological subject in a certain area where there is no State Department representative, then some other department having a competent representative in the area must be assigned the ad hoc responsibility for collecting the information for the NIA.

These principles of coordination are very simple, and I believe sufficiently obvious as to require no further elaboration. The system has begun to work well, and it can be made to work better and better as time goes on. The ultimate success of the coordinating effort, whether in the field or in Washington, will depend upon the full understanding of the departmental agencies and all their representatives. The system is - in the long run - no more than an orderly process of mutual assistance, designed to lighten excessive loads on individuals and to increase the over-all productiveness of the intelligence effort. .

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